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ABSTRACT 
We analyze equity financing for a two-stage investment and consider different informational 
structures. When private information is short-term, equilibria are consistent with signalling 
theory and pecking-order theory. When private information is long-term, equilibria may exist 
where high quality firms issue equity. The model explains the link between debt-equity choice 
and subsequent performance after issue (short-term versus long-term). A set of new predictions 
is generated regarding the link between the extent of asymmetric information and equity issues, 
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ABSTRACT 
We analyze equity financing for a two-stage investment and consider different informational 
structures. When private information is short-term, equilibria are consistent with signalling 
theory and pecking-order theory. When private information is long-term, equilibria may exist 
where high quality firms issue equity. The model explains the link between debt-equity choice 
and subsequent performance after issue (short-term versus long-term). A set of new predictions 
is generated regarding the link between the extent of asymmetric information and equity issues, 
macroeconomic performance and equity issues and market timing. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
       The modern theory of capital structure began with the famous proposition of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) that described the conditions of capital structure irrelevance. Since then, many 
economists have altered these conditions to explain the factors driving capital structure 
decisions. Harris and Raviv (1991) synthesize the major theoretical literature in the field and 
suggest promising avenues for future research. They argue that asymmetric information theories 
of capital structure are less promising than control-based or product-based theories. 
      The financial crisis of 2008-2009 forced financial economists to look critically at capital 
structure theory because the problems faced by many companies stemmed from their financing 
policies. Corporate managers appeared to lack an understanding of the role of asymmetric 
information. The market for mortgage-backed securities, which many believe was at the core of 
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financial crisis, involved asymmetric information between investors and issuers. 
         This paper builds on pecking order, signaling and market timing theories of capital 
structure. These theories directly relate to asymmetric information. The "Pecking-order theory" 
(POT) was put forth by Myers and Majluf (1984). According to this theory firms will use 
internal funds, if available, to finance profitable projects. In the case that internal funds are not 
available, they will issue debt. This creates the "pecking-order" where equity represents an 
inferior security. The evidence supports predictions of the pecking order theory such as the 
negative correlation between debt and profitability (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2007) and negative share price 
reaction on equity issue announcements (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Antweiler and Frank, 
2006). The evidence is mixed about whether firms always follow a pecking order hierarchy and 
whether the extent of asymmetric information reduces the incentive to issue equity (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), Fama and French (2002), Lemmon and 
Zender (2008), Leary and Roberts (2010), Galpin (2004) and Chen and Zhao (2004)). 
          In the pecking order model, good quality firms have to use internal funds to avoid adverse 
selection problems and losing value. These firms cannot signal their quality by changing their 
capital structure. The signalling theory of capital structure offers models in which capital 
structure serves as a signal of private information (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1978). Usually 
good quality firms increase leverage to signal quality. The empirical evidence supports such 
predictions of signaling theory as a negative market reaction on leverage-decreasing transactions 
and a positive reaction on leverage-increasing transactions excluding debt issues (Masulis, 1980; 
Antweiler and Frank, 2006; Baker, Powell, and Veit, 2003). Second, the evidence does not 
support a positive market reaction to debt issues (Eckbo, 1986; Antweiler and Frank, 2006). The 
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negative correlation between debt and profitability also contradicts signaling theory. Third, the 
evidence is mixed regarding the predictions of signaling theory about firms' operating 
performance after issuing equity. Long-term underperformance of firms issuing equity compared 
to non-issuing firms (Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1997) seems to be consistent 
with the spirit of signalling theory while better operating performance of firms issuing equity 
shortly after the issue compared to non-issuing firms does not support the theory. According to 
Jain and Kini (1994, Figure 1) the operating return on assets is higher for IPO firms in the first 
years after the issue and the operating cash flow on assets is higher in year "0" (immediately after 
issue). In Loughran and Ritter (1997) profit margins are higher in years 0 and +1, although there 
is different evidence about operating returns. In Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997, Table 3) IPO 
firms have higher performance in year 0. 
        We analyze a model where managers representing initial shareholders raise capital for an 
investment project. When investment is one-staged or private information is short-term, there is a 
pooling equilibrium that is consistent with the pecking-order theory in which no firms issue 
equity. This equilibrium does not contradict the signaling theory because no firms use equity 
issues as a signal of quality. When the investment is two-staged and private information is long-
term, one of two scenarios may arise. In one case, there is a pooling equilibrium that is consistent 
with pecking-order theory in which all types are financed by debt. In the second case, a 
separating equilibrium may exist where some firms (including highly-profitable firms) may issue 
equity. The following is an explanation of the main ideas behind the separating equilibrium. 
        First, it is well known that in a separating equilibrium, each financing strategy is chosen by 
the worst possible type of firm for that strategy (from the investor's viewpoint).
1
 Otherwise, the 
firm will be mimicked by other firms which will benefit from the overvaluation of issued 
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 Brennan and Kraus (1987). 
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securities. We show that the value of shares depends on the firm's total value and not on the 
timing of earnings or on the rate of earnings growth. If a firm, with a higher overall value in 
comparison to other firms, has high short-term expected performance and low long-term 
expected performance, it can issue equity to signal its quality. Other firms may find it 
unattractive to mimic this strategy. The reason being is that when the extent of asymmetric 
information about firms' overall value is small enough, the value of equity issued by the high-
value type is only marginally higher than the first-best value of this claim corresponding to other 
types. On the other hand, the expected value of claims issued by this firm for financing the 
second stage of investment is low (because of low expected performance in that period). Thus, 
other firms may find it unattractive to mimic high-value firms because of the expected loss in the 
second stage. This leads to the existence of a separating equilibrium in which a firm with high 
overall value issues equity. 
         The described above separating equilibrium implies that firms issuing equity have better 
operating performance at the moment of issue or soon after the issue. These firms also have 
lower operating performance in the long run. Leverage is negatively correlated with profitability 
because firms with higher profits in the first period issue equity in the first period. Firms with 
low rate of earnings growth issue equity and firms with high rate of earnings growth issue debt 
(Mohamed and Eldomiaty, 2008; and Chichti and Bougatef, 2010). The model also predicts that 
equity issues are more probable when the extent of asymmetric information about firms earnings 
profile over time is large while the extent of asymmetric information about firms overall values 
is small. 
        This paper shows that long-term asymmetric information can affect corporate capital 
structure. It contributes to POT literature by providing a model which explains the negative 
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correlation between debt and profitability and at the same time suggesting "new pecking order". 
In contrast to standard POT, firms can issue equity as a signal. This paper contributes to 
signalling theory by explaining why debt does not necessarily signals a firm quality. It also 
explains the link between debt-equity choice and subsequent performance after issue (short-term 
versus long-term). It contributes to the discussion about the link between the extent of 
asymmetric information and equity issues. The empirical evidence about this issue has been 
mixed from the point of view of either theory as was mentioned above. 
      The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a review of pecking-order 
theory, signalling theory and market timing theory. The basic model, its predictions and their 
consistency with empirical evidence are presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the model's 
extensions and robustness. The conclusion is drawn in Section 4.   Lengthy mathematical proofs 
are omitted for brevity. The proofs of some key results can be found in the Appendix. Others are 
available upon demand. 
   
1. PECKING-ORDER THEORY, SIGNALLING AND MARKET TIMING  
        The key element of POT is asymmetric information between firm's insiders and outsiders. 
Information asymmetries exist in almost every facet of corporate finance and complicate 
managers' ability to maximize firm values. Managers of good quality firms face the challenge of 
directly convincing investors about the true quality of their firm especially if this concerns future 
performance. As a result, investors will try to incorporate indirect evidence in their valuation of 
firm performance, which is done through the analysis of information-revealing actions, including 
capital structure choice.     
        Equity is dominated by internal funds in POT. Low-quality firms will use equity as much as 
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internal funds but high-quality firms will prefer internal funds. If high quality firms issue equity 
it will be undervalued by investors because of lack of information. Similarly equity is dominated 
by debt. Suppose that the firm can finance the project with risk-free debt. Then high-quality firm 
can issue debt to avoid any mispricing. If debt issued by the firm is risky, the situation does not 
change appreciably. The same holds if the firm has available assets-in-place. Hence a "pecking-
order" emerges: internal funds, debt, and equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Myers and Majluf 
(1984) show that this analysis basically holds in the case of continuum of types. The authors 
state (Myers and Majluf, 1984, p. 208): "In our model, the firm never issues equity. If it issues 
and invests it always issues debt." 
       The empirical evidence on whether firms follow the pecking order hierarchy is mixed. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Lemmon and Zender (2008), and a survey of NYSE firms by 
Kamath (1997) find support for pecking order while Chirinko and Singha (2000) and Leary and 
Roberts (2010) do not. Frank and Goyal (2003) show that the greatest support for pecking order 
occurs among large firms. 
        According to POT, the announcement of issuing stock drives down the stock price. 
Empirically, the announcements of equity issues result in significant negative stock price 
reactions (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Antweiler and Frank, 2006). Also good-quality firms tend 
to use internal funds for financing as much as possible. Because low-quality firms do not have as 
much profits and retained earnings as high-quality firms, they use external sources, usually debt, 
more frequently. This helps to explain the puzzle about the negative correlation between debt 
and profitability. 
       Finally, POT predicts that a higher extent of asymmetric information reduces the incentive 
to issue equity. The evidence, however, is ambiguous. D'Mello and Ferris (2000) and Bharath, 
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Pasquariello, and Wu (2008) support the prediction that POT is more likely to hold when the 
extent of asymmetric information is large. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) find that equity 
issues are more frequent when the economy is doing well and information asymmetry is low. 
Yet, Frank and Goyal (2003) find the greatest support for pecking order among large firms that 
are expected to face the least severe adverse selection problem because they receive better 
coverage by equity analysts. 
       The following summarizes the above analysis. The evidence supports predictions of the 
pecking order theory such as the negative correlation between debt and profitability, negative 
share price reaction on equity issue announcements, and better share price reaction on debt issues 
than on equity issues. The evidence is mixed about whether firms follow a pecking order 
hierarchy and whether the extent of asymmetric information reduces the incentive to issue 
equity. 
       A rich set of new predictions can arise when analyzing an environment with staged 
investments. Halov (2006), for example, proposes a model that considers a firm without internal 
funds where the choice of security depends not only on the current adverse selection cost of 
security but also on the future information environment and future financing needs of the firm. 
Debt issues today make future security issues more sensitive to the degree of asymmetric 
information in the issuance period. Halov finds that future adverse selection costs negatively 
affect the debt component of new external financing and positively affect the cash reserves of the 
firm. He explains why companies may prefer equity to debt and provides an idea about why the 
incentive for issuing equity depends both on the extent of asymmetric information in the current 
period and in future periods. In contrast to Halov (2006), in the present paper asymmetric 
information does not concern the overall quality of the firm but its earnings profile over time. 
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       In the pecking order model, good quality firms have to use internal funds to avoid adverse 
selection problems and losing value. These firms are unable to signal their quality by changing 
their capital structure. The signaling theory suggests models in which capital structure serves as a 
signal of private information (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977). Usually in these models the 
market reaction on debt issues (more generally, on leverage-increasing transactions, such as 
issuing convertible debt, repurchasing shares, and debt for equity swaps) is positive. Similarly, 
the market reaction on equity issues (or leverage-decreasing transactions) is negative. 
        A negative share price reaction on the announcement of equity issues is usually consistent 
with empirical evidence, as discussed in the previous section (similar for leverage-decreasing 
transactions). The evidence about the positive market reaction on leverage-increasing 
transactions (with the exception of debt issues) also supports signaling theory (Masulis, 1980; 
Antweiler and Frank, 2006; Baker et al., 2003). The evidence on the announcement of debt 
issues does not support signaling theories. Eckbo (1986) and Antweiler and Frank find 
insignificant changes in stock prices in response to straight corporate debt issues. 
        The other empirical prediction of signalling theory is that firm value (or profitability) and 
the debt-equity ratio is positively related. The evidence, however, is ambiguous. Most empirical 
studies report a negative relationship between leverage and profitability as discussed earlier. In a 
similar spirit, some studies document the superior absolute performance of equity-issuing firms 
before the issue and immediately after the issue (Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 
1997). On the other hand, several studies examine long-term firm performance following capital 
structure changes. Shah (1994) reports that business risk falls after leverage-increasing exchange 
offers but rises after leverage-decreasing exchange offers. Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, 
Partch, and Shah (1997), and Loughran and Ritter (1997) document the long-run operating 
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underperformance of equity issuing firms compared to non-issuing firms. 
       The above analysis leads to the following conclusions. The empirical evidence supports such 
predictions of signaling theory as a negative market reaction on leverage-decreasing transactions 
and a positive reaction on leverage-increasing transactions (excluding debt issues). The evidence 
does not support a positive market reaction to debt issues. The negative correlation between debt 
and profitability also contradicts the signaling theory. The evidence is mixed regarding the 
predictions of signaling theory about firms' operating performance after issuing equity. On one 
hand long-term underperformance of firms issuing equity compared to non-issuing firms 
supports the theory. On the other hand, better operating performance of firms issuing equity 
shortly after the issue compared to non-issuing firms does not support the theory. 
       Many explanations exist as to why managers of high-quality firms may use leverage-
decreasing transactions as a signal. These include issuing equity to signal low variance of 
earnings (Brick, Frierman, and Kim, 1998), retiring existing debt to signal earnings quality 
(Brennan and Kraus, 1987), signaling in a model that combines asymmetric information with 
agency problems (Noe and Rebello, 1996).
2
 A challenge for researchers today is to find a model 
that can explain several major empirical phenomena simultaneously. Two possible directions for 
research in signalling theory involve dynamic extensions of signaling models and security design 
models. 
        Hennessy, Livdan, and Miranda (2010) develop a dynamic model of the firm under repeated 
hidden information. In equilibrium, firms signal positive information by substituting debt for 
equity, which explains the inverse relationship between leverage and net worth. Firms with 
negative private information are unlevered, which is consistent with debt conservatism. In 
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Also see Heinkel (1982), Daniel and Titman (1995), Dybvig and Zender (1991), Giammarino and Neave (1982) 
and Noe (1988).  
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contrast to Hennessy et al (2010) where insiders receive private information about firm's quality 
in the current period, in the present paper private information is about the timing of earnings (it 
affects the firm's quality in two consecutive periods). 
       Sometime investors such as banks may be able to obtain information on a firm's quality or to 
produce analytical information. Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) show that good firms want to 
partition their securities so that some of the claims are informationally sensitive. If the cost of 
becoming informed is low and the degree of asymmetric information is high, firms may prefer a 
higher information sensitive security to promote information production by "specialized" outside 
investors. This explains the negative correlation between debt and firm value because firms with 
low profitability do not need to issue equity, which is sensitive to a firm's value. Fulghieri and 
Lukin also predict that younger firms with good growth opportunities are more likely to be 
equity financed. These firms can be especially interested in information production by outside 
investors.              
        The decision to issue equity depends on stock market performance (Lucas and McDonald, 
1990; Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald, 1992). It was not until Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
however, when this point had become one of the major capital structure theories also called 
“market timing” (MT). MT predicts that when the economy is bad, firms do not issue equity. 
When the economy has average performance, some firms will issue equity. When the economy is 
booming, equity issues are large. Empirical work by Choe et al. (1993), Bayless and Chaplinsky 
(1996), and Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggests a positive relationship between equity issues and 
the business cycle.  
        MT argues that firms issue equity when stock prices are relatively high. Empirical evidence 
supports the prediction that share price performance is important for equity issues decisions 
 12 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Kamath, 1997; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). Mixed evidence exists about whether investors overpay for shares. Some researchers 
argue that investors tend to be overly optimistic during new issues,  analyst forecasts are 
excessively high, and managers manipulate earnings prior to going public (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998). Some research argues in favor of an efficient market 
version of the market timing argument (Hansen and Sarin, 1998; Knill and Lee, 2006). Other 
research suggests that market timing is not based on good market performance as compared to a 
firm’s predicted performance. Instead, it is based on the market performance before the issue, 
called “pseudo-market timing” (Schultz, 2003; Butler, Grullon, and Weston, 2005).  
       It was found that stock return on stocks of companies issuing new shares underperform in 
the long run compared to that of non-issuing firms (“new issue puzzle”, Ritter and Welch, 2002).  
This puzzle suggests that investors purchasing IPO or SEO shares are irrational because they 
have lower return compared to investments in shares of non-issuing firms. Eckbo, Masulis, and 
Norli (2007) and Carter, Dark and Sapp (2009)  noticed, however, that one needs to estimate the 
risk of those firms to provide a correct interpretation of long-term underperformance of firms 
issuing stocks. 
      If the arrival of growth opportunities occurs independent of price history, then firms issuing 
equity will experience average performance before the issue. Firms with low share price will 
have above-average performance as they wait for the price to improve before they issue equity. 
Thus, on average, positive abnormal returns precede equity issues. The evidence confirms this 
prediction (Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald, 1990; Loughran and Ritter, 1995).  
        In summary, evidence generally supports the market timing theory. Evidence shows that 
managers wait before issuing equity until the stock market conditions get better. Also, stocks 
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tend to have high return before the issue of equity. Further, firms window-dress or improve their 
performance before issuing securities. Mixed evidence exists about whether investors overpay 
for shares. Also note that only few theoretical models exist on market timing. As a result, authors 
sometimes have different views about the interpretation of market timing. To be comparable with 
the trade-off theory or pecking-order theory, the market timing models should be able to explain 
a broader set of phenomena about capital structure. 
 
2. THE BASIC MODEL, ITS IMPLICATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
       Recent literature has provided evidence that staged investment and staged financing are 
broad phenomena. First, IPOs (initial public offerings) are usually followed by subsequent public 
offering within 3 years after issue (Billett, Flannery and Garfienkel, 2007). Hence, one expects 
that corporations plan or should anticipate the second issue. Since the second issue can be a part 
of their normal long-term planning process (strategic planning or business planning) that usually 
covers a 5-10 years horizon.
3
 
       Second, a firm's IPO underwriter often serves as a banker for the firm in the period 
following an IPO (Chen, Chen and Ho, 2007). Again, this is a good indicator that links exist 
between subsequent major rounds of firm's financing. Theo, Welch and Wong (1998) found that 
3/4 of IPO firms are actively involved in earnings management. They also argued that earnings 
management around IPO affects significantly the conditions for future rounds of financing. 
DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik (2004) report that average abnormal working capital accrual 
scaled by firm assets is 8.5% in the year of IPO. The authors argue that firms issuing equity are 
actively involved in earnings management. This fact as well their finding that shareholder 
lawsuits involving stock offers are positively related to abnormal accruals around the offer 
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 See, for instance, David (2006). 
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suggests that insiders may have private information about firm's performance after issue. 
         We build a model with asymmetric information that allows for focusing on a firm’s 
performance profile over time and its effect on capital structure. Consider a firm that consider 
equity financing for a two-period investment project with cost    in period  ,      . In each 
period the project may be successful or unsuccessful. In the latter case the cash flow equals   and 
in the former case the cash flow equals  . A firm’s insiders have private information about the 
probability of success in each stage. The firms are of two types, type   and type  , with 
respective probabilities of success     and     in stage  . The risk-free interest rate is zero. There 
exists universal risk-neutrality and perfect competition among investors, which implies zero 
market profit and risk-neutral valuation for any security issued. The net-present value of 
investment in stage   for type   is       ,      . 
      Suppose   issues equity for each stage of investments and distributes period   earnings as 
dividends. In stage  , investors require a fraction of equity    such that: 
                                                                                                                                            (1) 
In stage   investors require a fraction of equity    such that: 
                                                                                                                             (2) 
Now consider the payoff of shareholders of   in case   decides to mimic  . This equals    
 1)  1+(1− 1)(1− 2)  2. If a signaling equilibrium exists, the shareholders’ payoff for type 
   is                (the present value value of  ). Thus, a separating equilibrium exists if  
                                       . Using (1) and (2), this can be 
simplified to: 
                                                      
             
             
 
          
          
  
   
 
                                               (3) 
Pecking order 
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Suppose           ,            and      . Then the Equation 3 becomes     
             . Hence if projects have positive NPV (it implies      ) a separating 
equilibrium does not exist.
4
 Investors will rationally realize that   has an incentive to mimic   
and thus they will require higher fractions of equity than those offered by  . Alternative 
strategies for   do not lead to a separating equilibrium (for example, using internal funds for 
financing the second stage of investments). Therefore equilibrium is pooling where   is 
undervalued and   is overvalued. This confirms the pecking-order story. If internal funds would 
be available   would use them to avoid the mispricing. Equity is dominated by internal funds in 
this model. Low-quality firms will use equity as much as internal funds but high-quality firms 
will prefer internal funds. Similarly equity is dominated by debt. Suppose that the firm can 
finance the project with risk-free debt. Then   can issue debt to avoid any mispricing. If debt 
issued by the firm is risky, the situation does not change appreciably. One can show that debt 
suffers from misvaluation less than equity. The same holds if the firm has available assets-in-
place. Hence a "pecking-order" emerges: internal funds, debt, and equity (Myers and Majluf, 
1984).  
        More generally the separating equilibrium will never exists and POT holds if         and 
       . Also POT holds if one considers one-stage investment with short-term (one stage) 
private information. This is the case with             .
5
 
                                                          
4
 Cooney and Kalay (1993) demonstrate that POT can fail if projects have negative NPV. 
5
In Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) a firm receives earnings for two periods and private information is long-term 
but investment is one-staged (it corresponds to the case                in our model). Equity is ruled out 
because it is dominated by long-term debt. Also one can consider the case where information about second-period 
performance is revealed to insiders at the beginning of the second period. In this case the value of any claim issued 
by the type with higher expected earnings in the first period is greater than the value of this claim issued by the type 
with lower expected earnings in the first period. There exists a pooling equilibrium and pooling with equity is 
usually not optimal because of large mispricing for high-quality firms. Given this insight, the existing literature 
analyzing dynamic models with asymmetric information where insiders have short-term (one period) private 
information usually focuses on the role of other mechanisms and market imperfections for capital structure. These 
are, for example, costly debt financing, opportunity of delaying investment decisions or the presence of financial 
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The Extent of Asymmetric Information and Capital Structure 
          If the extent of asymmetric information regarding firms’ total values is sufficiently small 
and also if         and        , then Equation 3 holds (see Appendix). In an extreme case, 
for example, when                            , Equation 3 becomes        . 
Intuitively, the value of shares in period   depends on the firm's total value and not on the firm’s 
performance in a particular period, while the value of shares in period   depends on period  ’s 
performance. The firm with low overall value can benefit from overvaluation in period   but can 
have a loss from period   undervaluation. When asymmetric information regarding a firm’s 
overall value is relatively small and information regarding the timing of earnings is high, the 
latter effect can dominate. The separating equilibrium does not exist if the extent of asymmetric 
information regarding firms’ total values is high or when it is small but in opposite to previous 
case         and        . In that case the firm will low overall value will mimic the firm 
with high overall value because the latter has higher value of shares in both period 1 and 2. 
Firm’s performance after issue 
        A separating equilibrium where only high-value firms issue equity implies that firms issuing 
equity have better operating performance at the moment of issue or soon after the issue. These 
firms also have lower operating performance in the long run.  
       Existing literature suggests few explanations for the long-term underperformance of firms 
issuing equity. Among basic rational market intuitions, the following theories are notable. The 
theory of agency cost of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) underlines the idea that equity 
issues decrease the manager's stake in the company and reduce the incentive to undertake value 
maximizing projects. This results in afterissuing underperformance of the firm, though the theory 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
intermediaries. Notable among the well-known contributions are Lucas and MacDonald (1990), Berkovitch and 
Narayanan's (1993), Viswanath (1993) and Hennessy et al (2010). 
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does not compare the performance in the short run with that in the long run after the issue. Also 
note that the link between afterissuing underperformance and a low managerial fraction of equity 
is empirically controversial. For instance, Pagano et al. (1995), Cai and Loughran (1998) and 
Mickelson et al. (1997) do not confirm the positive correlation between the fraction of insiders' 
equity and firm performance. 
           The trade-off theory in its standard form, proposing that firms equalize the marginal tax 
benefits associated with additional debt to the marginal cost of bankruptcy, suggests that more 
profitable firms should issue more debt. However, it will not predict the link between debt-equity 
choice and dynamic profile of performance after the issue (long-term performance versus short-
term performance). For instance, it will predict that type (high expected performance in the first 
period) should issue more debt than in the first period in contrast to our results. According to the 
free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) debt is an instrument for solving the problem of a manager's 
entrenchment and thus more debt should lead to higher overall performance. However, this 
theory does not give an explanation for why firms should issue equity. This theory would also 
suggest that type (with high expected performance in the first period) should issue debt in order 
to prevent managers from overspending. Recently several dynamic versions of the trade-off 
model were developed which combine taxes, bankruptcy costs and different kinds of agency 
costs. Typically, these models lead to less extreme and more realistic predictions than the basic 
ideas do. However, we have not found a model which systematically analyzes the link between 
debt-equity choice and dynamic profile of operating performance after the issue. We will provide 
more discussion of dynamic trade-off models later when we discuss the correlation between debt 
and profitability. 
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        To relate MT to the evidence about operating performances, one line of the literature 
focuses on non-rational aspects of investors’ behavior. However, as was mentioned above, the 
evidence related to investors’ irrationality is mixed. The literature based on rational investors is 
able to argue why firms may be interested in issuing equity in periods when market prices are 
high although it is not focused on explaining the link between debt-equity choice and changes in 
operating performance after issue (long-term versus short-term). 
Market timing 
      Suppose that the probability of success in period   is             . The publicly 
available parameter    depends on the macroeconomic situation. Again consider a separating 
equilibrium where   issues equity. If     mimics   and issues equity its payoff is            
 1)+(1− 1)(1− 2)  2, where  1 and  2 are determined by the following equations: 
         and                          . Let    be the difference between the 
payoff of   from mimicking   and its first-best value:                         
 2)  2−(  1+ 1+  2− 1− 2). Then a separating equilibrium where   issues equity exists 
if    is negative.   As was mentioned above a necessary condition for separating equilibrium is 
       . The derivative of    with respect to    is 
           
   
  . Thus a separating 
equilibrium is more probable if   is high.   
     The model predicts that when the economy is bad (   is low), firms do not issue equity. 
When the economy is booming (   is high), equity issues are large. Empirical work by Choe et 
al. (1993), Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), and Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggests a positive 
relationship between equity issues and the business cycle. 
Share Price and Equity Issue 
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        Higher    implies higher share price. Let   denote the initial number of shares outstanding 
and let     denote the number of shares issued by type   in period   in case a separating 
equilibrium exists. Let   be the share price in period 1. From (1) and (2) we have    
  
             
. By definition it is also equal to 
   
     
. Also        . Solving these equations 
we find 
                                                              
                
 
                                                       (4) 
From previous section we know that issuing equity is more likely when    is large. From (4) it 
follows that equity issues are more likely when the share price is high.        
       The other interpretation of this result regards stock returns before equity issue. If the arrival 
of growth opportunities is independent of price history, then firms issuing equity will have 
above-average performance as they wait for the price to improve before they issue equity. Thus, 
on average, positive abnormal returns precede equity issues.  
Long-term macroeconomic performance and equity issues 
     Suppose that the probability of success in period   is             . The publicly 
available parameter    depends on the macroeconomic situation. Let    be the difference 
between the payoff of   from mimicking   and its first-best value:                    
 2)(  2+ 2  (  1+  2+ 2  1  2) where  1 and  2 are determined by the following 
equations:               and                          .  A separating 
equilibrium where   issues equity exists if     is negative.  As was mentioned above a necessary 
condition for separating equilibrium is              . The derivative of left side with 
respect to   is 
                  
         
.  
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If   is doing very poorly in period 2 and         then this derivative is negative and a 
separating equilibrium is more probable if the economy is good in the long-term (high   ). If 
         then the derivative is positive and thus equity issue is more probable if the economy 
is not expected to be good in period 2.  
     This analysis suggests that the decision to issue equity may not only be related to the current 
or short-term forecast of macroeocnomic situation but also on its long-term forecast.  
     Let us now summarize the analysis in Section 2. The model provides some rationale for 
explaining the following facts: 
    (i) Firms issuing equity underperform in the long-run as compared to non-issuing firms 
(measured as a decline of profit, profit to assets ratio or profit per share). (ii) Equity issues are 
more likely when economic performance is good. Thus, equity issues are procyclical. (iii) Firms 
issues equity when share prices are high. 
      The second contribution is that it provides some new theoretical results that have hitherto not 
been tested. 
    (i) The model predicts that the performance of firms issuing equity exceeds the performance of 
the non-issuing firms at the time of issue (or in the near future after issue). The separating 
equilibrium where   issues equity is only possible when        . While this point was not the 
main focus of the empirical research cited above, some authors did stress the point that issuing 
firms outperform non-issuing firms just before issue, and others documented that issuing firms 
outperform non-issuing firms in the year of issue and in the first year after issue (Mikkelson, 
Partch and Shah (1997) and Jain and Kini (1994)). 
    (ii) This paper suggests a new motive for issuing equity that has not been explored in existing 
literature. When the firm knows that it will be high-profitable in the near future and low-
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profitable in the long-term, the entrepreneur may want to issue equity. This paper shows that 
firms follow POT under asymmetric information only if the horizon of insiders private 
information is short-term or investment is one-stage. When investment is two-stage and 
information is long-term then two types of behavior may emerge, one consistent and one 
inconsistent with POT. 
    (iii) As was mentioned in Section 1, the issue of the link between the extent of asymmetric 
information and equity issues is controversial in existing literature. The model suggests that 
equity issues are more likely when the extent of asymmetric information regarding firms overall 
values is relatively small while that regarding earnings profile over time is large. Possible tests of 
this prediction will be based on identifying firms and industries with high degree of asymmetric 
information regarding the timing of earnings. One can use the spread in analysts' valuations of 
firms' shares as a proxy for the extent of asymmetric information regarding the firms' total values 
and the spread in the forecasts of future earnings (long-term spread versus short-term spread) as 
a proxy for asymmetric information about future rates of earnings growth. Also firms 
manipulating earnings prior to issue (as in Theo and all, 1998) can be seen as ones with high 
degree of asymmetric information about timing of earnings since earnings management can often 
be seen as a redistribution of earnings between periods rather than accounting fraud (Degeorge, 
Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), Miglo (2010)). 
    (iv) This paper suggests that the long-term post-issue underperformance for firms issuing 
equity, as well as negative correlation between debt and profitability (as we discussed below), 
should be more pronounced when the economy is growing.
6
 
    (v) Finally, the paper suggests that the decisions to issue equity depends not only on the 
                                                          
6
The existing research about long-term afterissuing operating performance of firms issuing equity does not 
separately analyze different phases of business cycles. 
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current economic situation but also on the long-term economic forecast. 
 
3. MODEL’S EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS 
1. Debt issues. One can consider an extension where firms are allowed to issue debt. The main 
conclusions of basic model will not be affected. The same conditions will be required in order 
for a separating equilibrium to exist where a type with better short-term performance and 
respectively bad long-term performance issues equity. In this equilibrium the other type can issue 
short-term debt in the first period. Since it has worst performance in the first period, the interest 
rate on debt will be relatively high. The other type will not mimic this strategy.  
      Thus the model extension with debt predicts that leverage is negatively correlated with 
profitability. To see this let us look at the dynamics of capital structure (in market values) of both 
types of firms over two periods. Consider the basic model and a separating equilibria where   
issues short-term debt and   issues equity. In period 1 (after the securities are issued until the 
earnings are received) the debt/equity ratio of type   is 0 and that of type   is 
  
             
 (the 
denominator shows the market value of firm's equity). It is clear that the debt/equity ratio of type 
  is higher than that of type   while the opposite is true for average earnings in the first period. 
This conclusion does not change if one measures debt/equity ratios at the end of first period 
(after the earnings are received but before second-period financing decision is made). 
        The trade-off theory in its standard form is inconsistent with the negative correlation 
between debt and profitability because highly-profitable firms should tend to finance with debt in 
order to reduce their taxes. Hennessy and Whited (2005) develop a dynamic trade-off theory 
with the idea that a profitable firm does not have to distribute its earnings immediately as the 
standard models assume. This may reduce the incentive to reduce taxes by issuing debt. The 
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financing decision depends on the next period financing margin or what the firm is going to do in 
the future: to issue more equity, to distribute more earnings or to remain neutral. While providing 
a valid intuition about why the static trade-off may not work, the authors do not obtain a 
theoretical proposition about the link between debt and profitability. However, they do show 
numerically that under some plausible values of parameters one can observe the negative 
correlation between debt and profitability in their model. 
     Zwiebel (1996) develops a dynamic model of capital structure based on the managers' 
entrenchment argument. The paper suggests that when a firm has more valuable investment 
opportunities the need to issue new debt as a disciplinary device decreases which leads to the 
situation where firms with lower debt are likely to be more profitable. While providing an idea 
about the negative correlation between debt and profitability the paper does not explain why 
firms issuing equity underperform in the long run. Also equity financing is not explicitly 
analyzed in the model. 
2. Mixed financing. Allowing mixed financing provides little usefulness for the analysis of 
operating performance of firms issuing equity versus that of non-issuing firms. The reason is that 
most empirical literature on this topic does not differentiate issuers according to fractions of 
equity in capital structure. Even a marginally small issue of shares puts a firm into the category 
of issuing firms. Thus it will be hard to interpret the equilibrium in terms of existing empirical 
evidence. However, allowing for mixed financing is important with regard to the conclusions 
about the negative correlation between debt and profitability. With mixed financing, firms have a 
much greater degree of freedom than in the basic model and thus the set of possible equilibriums 
becomes much larger. More precisely each combination of initial parameters can support several 
separating equilibrium, in most cases a continuum of equilibria. One can show that in qualitative 
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aspects the results are very similar to those found in the basic model. First of all, the valuation of 
securities in this setting has a lot in common with pure financing scenarios. For instance, the 
share price depends only on the firm's total value and not on the rate of earnings growth. 
Secondly, we show that an increase of debt in the capital structure of firm type with greater rate 
of earnings growth reduces the potential earnings of the type with smaller rate of earnings 
growth if it mimics the former and conversely an increase of equity in the capital structure of the 
type with smaller rate of earnings growth reduces the potential payoff of the type with greater 
rate of earnings growth if it mimics the former. This in turn leads to the following result. For 
each set of exogenous parameters there exist two subsets of separating equilibria such that: 1) in 
any equilibrium in subset 1  the type with greater rate of earnings growth uses a higher fraction 
of debt financing than the type with smaller rate of earnings growth; 2) an equilibrium  where the 
former type chooses strategy 1 and the latter chooses strategy 2 belongs to subset 2 if and only if 
a separating equilibrium where the type with greater rate of earnings growth chooses strategy 2 
and the type with smaller rate of earnings growth chooses strategy 1 also belongs to subset 2.
7
 
      The subset 1 provides strong support for the results of the basic model about the negative 
correlation between debt and profitability. Firms issuing more equity have lower leverage during 
the first period and higher profitability in that period and vice versa in the second period. On the 
other hand, the subset 2 is irrelevant in predicting the link between debt and profitability since on 
average among all equilibriums in this set, type with greater rate of earnings growth has the same 
debt as type with smaller rate of earnings growth. Thus, it is similar to a pooling equilibrium 
situation which is not able to generate any predictions of this kind. 
                                                          
7
 Similar approach was used in Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995), proposition 3. 
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3. Different profit distribution functions. Now we briefly comment on the model's robustness 
with respect to possible generalizations of projects' profit distribution functions.
8
 For example, 
one can consider situation where different types' profits are ordered by first-order dominance. 
One can show that the basic results hold. The key here is that the share price of newly issued 
shares in period 1 depends on firm total values while the share price in period 2 relies mostly on 
the firm’s performance in period 2. Thus firms with high second-period expected earnings will 
not issue equity because they will be mimicked by firms with low second-period earnings. 
However, the determination of exact conditions for the existence of different types of 
equilibrium, especially for the case of multiple type economy becomes very difficult technically. 
Nevertheless, numerical calculations for some classes of distribution functions confirm the 
results found in this paper. 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
        This paper examines equity issues in a dynamic setting (two-stage investment process) 
under asymmetric information. The analysis is based on the idea that firms have private 
information about their profit profiles over time. When private information is short-term, 
equilibria is consistent with the pecking-order theory. Firms with high value never issue equity in 
equilibrium. When private information is long-term two cases may appear. When the extent of 
asymmetric information concerning the firms' overall values is high and that concerning the 
profit profiles over time is small, firms' behavior is consistent with POT. However, when the 
extent of asymmetric information concerning firms' total values is small enough and that 
concerning profit profiles over time is high enough, equilibria may exist where high-value type 
issues equity. 
                                                          
8
 Recall that we use the Bernoulli function in the model. 
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     This paper proposes new explanations for some important phenomena about capital structure 
such as long-term post-issue operating underperformance for firms issuing equity, positive 
correlation between business cycle and equity issues, and negative correlation between debt and 
profitability. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to simultaneously explain all of these 
phenomena. 
     Also this paper provides some new theoretical results that have hitherto not been tested. This 
paper: suggests that firms issuing equity have superior performance at the time of issue; suggests 
new motivations for issuing debt and equity, that are based on private information about profit 
profile over time; argues that long-term post-issue underperformance for firms issuing equity, as 
well as negative correlation between debt and profitability, should be more pronounced when the 
economy is growing. 
  
Appendix     
      Let    denote type   expected earnings over two periods (          );    denote the rate of 
earnings growth (          ) and   denote the payoff of shareholders of type   in case   
mimics  . The firm's performance can be described by a douplet (     ). The probabilities of 
success in each stage are then: 
                                                             
  
    
 and     
    
    
                                                     (5) 
    Lemma 1.          and         . 
    Proof. Part 1. Using (1), (2), (5) and the following identity: 
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    Part 2. Using (1), (2), (5) and the following identity: 
                                 
  
   
 
  
   
 
   
    
    
   
 
   
    
    
   
  
  
   
   
    
    




   
 
             
             
  . End proof.     
    Lemma 2. 1) Either                 for any    (other parameters being equal) or 
there exists   
   such that                 if and only if      
 ; 2) Other parameters 
being equal, there exists   
  such that                 if and only if      
 . 
    Proof. From Lemma 1,         . In extreme case when    is such that        ,   
mimics  . Thus either   mimics   for all values of   , or there exists   
  such that       
          if and only if      
 . Part 2. From Lemma 1,         . In an extreme case, 
when      ,   does not mimic  . On another extreme when        ,   mimics  . Thus 
there exists   
  such that                 if and only if      
 . End proof. 
Lemmas 1 and 2 lead in turn to the following result. 
    Proposition 1. A separating equilibrium where   issues equity exists if and only if the 
difference between firms values are sufficiently small, and the difference between the rates of 
earnings growth is sufficiently high. 
    Proof. By Lemma 4, for given values of    and   , a separating equilibrium where   issues 
equity exists if and only if the following holds: 1)   
  exists (Lemma 2) and      
 ; 2)   
  exists 
(Lemma 2) and      
 . Thus, for given values of    and   , a separating equilibrium where   
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